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I would like to start this talk with two quotes that illustrate the ten-
sion that constitutes the philosophical terrain onto which I will be wading
today.
The goal of science is to make the wonderful and complex un-
derstandable and simple—but not less wonderful. —Herb Si-
mon, Sciences of the Artificial.
That which is complex cannot be pinned down. To pin it down
is to lose it. —Annemarie Mol and John Law, Complexities.
We are faced with a fundamental problem for any science of complexity.
To render the complex world understandable it is necessary to simplify it,
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but how can we render the complex simple without losing that which is
distinctive and interesting about it? If complex systems are indeed ‘irre-
ducible’ and therefore cannot be represented in ‘simple’ analytical mod-
els (Cilliers, 1998:9), is scientific reflection on complex systems doomed to
be uninteresting reductions that can never grasp what is truly important?
And if we insist on the irreducibility of complexity, can we avoid superfi-
cial accounts that are prone to relativist interpretations?
This is a problem with which Paul was well-acquainted, which is why
he dealt extensively with models of complex systems in his book, and
also explicitly addressed their epistemological in his Inaugural Lecture
“Do modest positions have to be weak?”. He seemed comfortable on the
tightrope between reductionism on the one hand and paralysing relativism
on the other.
In addressing these questions—even in the restricted domain of the hu-
man sciences—we cannot but reflect on the nature of the scientific enter-
prise itself. It is relatively easy to show that traditional analytical mod-
els—like the exhaustive mathematical models that dominate economics,
the most resolutely ‘scientific’ of the human sciences—are usually inad-
equate when dealing with complex social systems. What is harder is bring-
ing into relief the epistemological foundations of the various approaches
to complexity and strategies for modelling it that have come to the fore
in recent years. One prominent approach is computational models of so-
cial systems, which includes agent-based models that place (much simpli-
fied) virtual individuals within simulated social worlds and observe the
system-level outcomes of their interactions over time. Other approaches
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include connectionist models of cognition (as apposed to more traditional
‘rule-based’ artificial intelligence), social network analysis and the study
of ‘social capital’. All of these approaches attempt, in a sense, to replicate
the complexity of the social worlds that they represent, while—in order to
be useful—they must also reduce that complexity to manageable propor-
tions. They therefore necessarily operate in fraught epistemological ter-
rain: which elements of the complex reality are ‘inessential’ and can be
discarded in the model? What kind of knowledge about reality can these
models provide?
Of course, the various approaches to modelling complex social sys-
tems do not operate in an intellectual vacuum. The postwar human sci-
ences—and in particular the ‘harder’ social sciences like economics, so-
ciology, political science and psychology—were dominated by a current
of ‘methodological positivism’ characterised by a striving for empirical
groundedness and for universal, generalisable results (see review in Stein-
metz, 2005). In many cases this dominant positivism found expression in
the preference for formal (mathematical) models and data-driven quantit-
ative techniques. Likewise, some approaches to complexity reflect a pos-
itivist yearning for objective knowledge and exhaustive, formal specific-
ation of models, like those of the Santa Fé School. But other theorists of
complexity, like Paul and Edgar Morin, draw on the continental philo-
sophical tradition and link complexity to a more ‘modest’ epistemology
in which the status of scientific knowledge is problematised (see Cilliers,
2002; Heylighen et al., 2006; Cilliers, 2005; Morin, 2007).
I will argue that it is not necessary to succumb to either positivist re-
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ductionism or to a relativist ‘weak epistemology’. Rather, it is possible
to develop accounts of social phenomena that are sensitive to irreducible
complexity and acknowledge the limits of scientific knowledge—and that
can therefore never claim to be complete—but that nevertheless allow us
to ‘get a handle on’ a complex reality by making strategic use of ‘simple’
models and reductive techniques.
While this is not my central concern today, it is necessary to emphasise
that the epistemological choices we make have profound ethical and polit-
ical implications. I have argued elsewhere that an epistemological stance
that recognises complexity can inform a critical philosophy (Grebe, 2010).
The intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment, with its reductive impulse,
is (despite its many achievements) ill-suited to coping with contingency
and difference—something which is essential if we are to avoid ‘totalit-
arian’ thinking and its political correlates.1 This is an insight that came to
me and many others from Paul, whose unrelenting emphasis on the eth-
ical and political dimension of philosophical positions, be they epistemolo-
gical, ontological or aesthetic, theoretical or applied, stands as a testament
to his deeply humanistic and compassionate impulse.
1Two powerful critiques of the Enlightenment’s denial of difference and the ethico-
political  implications  of  this  denial  are  those  of  the  Frankfurt  School, principally
Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/ 2002) and, more recently, that of Zygmunt Bauman
(1989) (see also discussion in Mol and Law, 2002). Both these critiques link the horrible
abuses of twentieth century Europe to an intellectual tradition that evacuated difference
and uncertainty in favour of an uncritical notion of scientific and social progress.
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Ockham’s Razor: ‘simplicity’ and reductionism in
modernist science
A central norm in modernist science—and one that remains highly fa-
voured—is  what  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  Simplicity  Principle  (or
sometimes  the  Principle  of  Parsimony), often  invoked  in  the  form of
‘Ockham’s Razor’, formulated by William of Ockham2 (c. 1285-1348). The
most common formulation of Ockham’s Razor is “Don’t multiply entities
beyond necessity” (Spade, 2006) and expresses succinctly the notion that,
other things being equal, simpler theories are better. While Ockham used
it to counter over-elaborate metaphysical theories, simplicity has become
a norm in all of science and most of philosophy. I have called it a ‘norm’
because the emphasis on reducing theories to the simplest form possible is
often not explicitly stated (nor examined), but is rather deeply embedded
in the epistemological and methodological framework of the sciences.
In  fact, versions  of  the  Simplicity  Principle  date  from  long  before
Ockham (e.g. Aristotle formulated a version of it in the Posterior Ana-
lytics). It was accepted by influential Enlightenment philosophers, like
Kant, but perhaps most significantly by scientific pioneers both medi-
eval—like Newton, whose classical mechanics can be seen as the starting
point of modern science—and more recent, like Einstein who strove for
the  simplest  possible  formulations  in  his  theory  of  General  Relativity
(Einstein, 1920, cited in Edmonds, 2007:65). Newton’s physics is also a
paradigmatic expression of the Cartesian principle of analysis or reduc-
2Also spelt ‘Occam’.
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tion: that to understand a complex phenomenon one must understand
its constituent parts (Heylighen et al., 2006:3). There is therefore a close
link  between  the  Principle  of  Simplicity  and  reductionism: often  the
best way to arrive at the simplest possible theory is through the method
of reduction: find the simplest elements and processes that give rise to
the complex phenomenon you wish to explain and describe them in the
simplest possible way.
Two questions, however, present themselves: (1) do the justifications
for the Simplicity Principle hold up? and (2) are the Simplicity Principle
and the analytical method appropriate methodological and epistemolo-
gical norms in the study of complex social systems? We must therefore
look a little more closely at the tradition of analytical/reductive science
and the place therein of simplicity and reduction, before we turn to pos-
itivism (closely linked to reductionism) and antipositivism in the human
sciences.
Despite the fact that the Simplicity Principle is well-established and im-
plicitly or explicitly accepted by most scientists, there is a surprising de-
gree of vagueness and philosophical uncertainty over what it in fact means
(or should mean) and how it can be justified. Oddly, many philosophers
of science—especially those in the analytical and logical-positivist tradi-
tions—seem more interested in the question ‘what is the correct justifica-
tion for the Simplicity Principle?’ than in the question of whether the prin-
ciple is valid and universal in the first place. Rather than review all the
important debates around this topic, the focus here will be on the central
claims of adherents of the Simplicity Principle and whether one would be
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justified in discarding it. Interested readers may wish to consult one of a
number of good philosophical surveys of Simplicity: Hesse (1967), Zellner
et al. (2002a) or Baker (2010). If, however, as Edmonds (2007) suggests,
simplicity is not truth-indicative, these debates become largely moot, and
the simplicity principle becomes largely a matter of practical convenience.
While the formulation of the Simplicity Principle cited earlier merely
suggests that, ceteris paribus, simpler theories are ‘better’, more often than
not this is assumed to mean that simpler theories are more likely to be
‘true’. The latter corresponds with an epistemic interpretation of the prin-
ciple—i.e. all things being equal, reason requires that one believe a simpler
theory—as opposed to a methodological interpretation, suggesting that it is
rational to adopt a simpler theory as a working theory for scientific pur-
poses (Baker, 2010). To complicate matters further, a number of further
distinctions are possible, including between syntactic simplicity (simpli-
city of hypotheses/theories about the world, often called ‘elegance’) and
ontological simplicity (number and complexity of postulated things in the
world, often called ‘parsimony’), with the two notions of simplicity fre-
quently pulling in opposite directions (Baker, 2010). For the purposes of
this discussion, I am mostly referring to syntactic simplicity, though the
distinction is hard to maintain rigorously.
Which interpretation of the simplicity principle we are employing is of
the utmost importance for determining whether the justifications offered
in support of it are valid and to what extent the principle is binding. The
question of justifying a Simplicity Principle is connected to the broader
problem in the philosophy of science known as the ‘underdetermination’
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of theory by empirical data (i.e. empirical observations can be explained
by multiple theories that are not compatible with one another and do not
in themselves imply that a specific theory must be the correct one). When
the principle is give in its (stronger) epistemological form (‘simpler theor-
ies are more likely to be true’) it requires a priori justification, whereas in
its (weaker) methodological form it merely requires pragmatic a posteriori
justification. A priori justifications of simplicity can take the form of theolo-
gical and metaphysical justifications, appeals to the ‘intrinsic value’ of sim-
plicity or via ‘principles of rationality’. However, since the latter simply
shifts the problem to the justification for a more fundamental a priori ra-
tional principle, these justifications often boil down to an appeal to philo-
sophical intuition or the self-evident value of simplicity. As Cartwright
(2010:90) points out, ‘epistemic virtues’ are often invoked in an attempt to
‘solve’ the problem of underdetermination. But there is no real basis for
labelling these specific virtues as ‘epistemic’:
If the phenomena in a domain are complex or diverse, why
should choosing the simplest claim or the one that unifies the
most help in arriving at true claims? We may suppose that truth
and our favourite epistemic virtues march hand-in-hand, but
that looks to be one of those grand ‘metaphysical’ assumptions
not confirmed by the detailed scrutiny demanded of proper sci-
entific claims. (Cartwright, 2010:91)
A priori justifications seem to keep the Principle of Simplicity firmly in the
realm of metaphysics (Zellner et al., 2002b:1), which may explain why nat-
8
uralistic justifications based on an appeal to scientific practice have gained
currency, even in analytical philosophy (Baker, 2010). But naturalistic jus-
tifications of simplicity move us firmly into the realm of pragmatic justi-
fications and adherents of simplicity can no longer sidestep the question
that complexity poses: are simpler theories really better at making sense
of complex phenomena? It is relatively easy to see, however, why simpler
theories would have practical advantages: they are simply easier formu-
late, understand and communicate. However, once we abandon a priori
epistemic justifications, simplicity in many ways stops being a principle is
superseded by the question of which theory ‘works best’ given the object
of study and the purposes of the theorist. If simplicity is not a fundamental
truth-indicative principle, and if the object of study is a ‘complex system’,
simplicity is at most a guideline that can help us choose between more
than one ‘equally good’ theory—assuming that all are sufficiently capable
of reflecting (replicating) the complex features we are interested in.
Many will respond to this line of inquiry with charges of relativism (and
indeed Cartwright does take a radically relativist position with respect to
the status of scientific knowledge), but this is not a necessary implication
of questioning the value of reductionism. Saying ‘simpler theories are not
necessarily better’ is not the same as saying ‘any one theory is as good as
another’ or ‘the value of a theory can only be measured relative to arbitrary
values’.
As Smaling (2005) argues, the Simplicity Principle as a norm of scientific
quality is closely linked to the ‘empirical-analytical tradition’, to which
there exists alternatives like the ‘hermeneutical-interpretive tradition’ in
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the human sciences. In the latter, paying attention to context, alternative
meanings—in short, complexity—is emphasised:
Within the hermeneutical-interpretive tradition … simplicity is
not posed as a separate norm. … For this reason and because
of other differences, the adherents of the empirical-analytical
approach do not take the hermeneutical-interpretive approach
very  seriously. Hermeneutical-interpretive  and also  critical
(neo-Marxist or otherwise) approaches belong to the collection
of regrettable victims of Ockham’s Razor. Regrettable, because
the  justification  of  the  use  of  Ockham’s  Razor  is  doubtful.
(Smaling, 2005:50)
I would argue, therefore, that it is not a question of the wholesale accept-
ance or rejection of the Simplicity Principle, but rather of balancing in the-
ory or model selection the benefits of simplicity (which are very real from
a pragmatic perspective) with the advantages of allowing greater theor-
etical complexity. (In statistics, this is sometimes described as the ‘trade-
off between parsimony and goodness-of-fit’.) When studying phenomena
that exhibit complexity (and especially those that involve human agents),
the advantages of more complex theories are clear (i.e. ‘goodness-of-fit’
is improved by allowing the complexity of the object to be mirrored in
the theory). Adopting this pragmatic approach implies, however, a more
modest epistemology than that which characterises positivist science or
the ‘empirical-analytical tradition’—one in which the context and the con-
cerns of the observer become relevant. I will return later to the question of
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whether this plea for ‘pragmatic simplicity’ can be accepted without des-
cending into a self-defeating scientific relativism.
One of Paul’s most distinctive contributions was to trace, despite their
origins in very different traditions, the affinity between a complex systems
perspective and poststructuralist philosophy. When complexity is viewed
in this light, its potential for informing a ‘postpositivist’ critical perspective
in the human sciences—i.e. one that rejects the self-understanding of social
reflection as autonomous of the social phenomena that are its objects and of
its methodology as universal, contextless and value-free—becomes clear.
In the written version of this paper I review some of the ways in which
a complex systems perspective has been employed in the human sciences.
I won’t do so here, except to emphasise that neither a complex systems
perspective nor connectionist or computational models of complex social
systems is a panacea for our epistemological ills: on the one hand the prob-
lem of underdetermination persists and on the other it raises the spectre of
relativism. Is there a way out of this double bind?
Conclusion: Is there an alternative to reduction-
ism and relativism?
It would be disingenuous to claim that the arguments I make in this paper
do not have relativising implications for scientific modelling. By abandon-
ing the Simplicity Principle as a truth criterion we are losing one of the
most widely used criteria for model selection. In making a plea for ‘prag-
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matic simplicity’—i.e. opting for simpler theories only where and when they
make the most practical sense—we are necessarily raising questions such as
‘make sense to whom?’ and ‘make sense for what?’. Practical concerns
such as intelligibility and communicability are by definition relative to the
researcher and the (social) context within which she works.
Speaking descriptively, it is hard to disagree that that model selection in
the world of practical science is be guided more often by heuristics than by
a priori principles like simplicity or falsifiability, leaving more room for the
process to be ‘contaminated’ by the social world of the scientist (see, for
example, Latour, 1999). Further, as Edmonds (2007:70) points out, we are
highly selective in what we attempt to model—i.e. “we usually concentrate on
that tip of the natural world iceberg which is not too complex for our abil-
ities”. Recognising that bias exists not only in how we select to model the
world but also in what we select to model implies that, to a certain degree,
models are relative to the modeller. Furthermore, conceiving of the object
of the human sciences as a complex social system implies that the very con-
stitution of that system is impacted by the ‘framing’ processes performed
by the observer (scientist). For example, the level of analysis and units of
analysis, as well as the level of detail captured in the data gathered em-
pirically, are ‘chosen’ (not necessarily consciously) by the researcher. This
means that the observer in an important sense provides the context that is
necessary for the system to be constituted as a system. Clearly, this implies
that in an important sense the system is ‘relative to the observer’ although
this claim should not be construed as a claim that the system is ‘determ-
ined’ by the observer, and that meaning is simply ‘projected’ onto the data.
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But does recognising the sociality of science and its inability to live up
to the positivist dream of unbiased reflection of the world imply that sci-
ence is simply ‘yet another internally validated discourse’? I would argue
not: admitting to the relativising implications of a complex systems per-
spective does not imply that we have to adopt a self-defeating relativist
position in which any one model is as good as another. In hermeneutical
terms both the observation and the modelling of complex systems could
be described as a Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’ between the reader and
the text, or even as a Derridean ‘reading’ of the text (read: world). Seen in
this way, the limits imposed by context are precisely what enable meaning,
including scientific meaning. Perhaps this position is best characterised as
‘modest’ (as opposed to ‘weak’) in the sense that Cilliers (2005:263) uses the
term: conscious of its own limitations, but not claiming that any one model
is as good as another or that the scientific enterprise is doomed. Rather, it
is a claim for pragmatism in the face of the limitations of scientific know-
ledge and of the fact of that knowledge’s social, contextual and temporal
situatedness.
A key challenge, however, remains saying something useful  about
complex systems, other than merely that they are complex. Approaches
such as relational models of society—while no doubt able to illuminate
certain aspects of certain kinds of complex systems and therefore very
valuable—still attempt to develop what are in essence analytical models
of complex systems and therefore remain vulnerable to charges of unjus-
tified reductionism. Mol and Law’s (2002:7-11) notion of ‘multiplicites’
may be helpful in conceiving of an approach that moves us beyond the
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dilemma of complex and opaque vs. analytical and reductionist. But such an
approach must be elaborated in practice—i.e. in new knowledge practices
and methodologies that bring complexity to light in those spaces where
analytical ‘orders’ meet and coexist in unresolved tension.
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